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Abstract 
As the housing crisis escalated during the second half of 2007, two government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), occupied an increasingly central 
role in the secondary mortgage market, purchasing a greater percentage of new mortgages 
as private securitization rapidly contracted. As their importance in this market grew, the 
two GSEs also began to suffer billion-dollar losses, inciting concerns that they might not be 
able to stay solvent throughout the remainder of the crisis. On September 6, 2008, fearing 
the systemic consequences of the two  firms’ failures, the GSEs’ new regulator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), took both entities into indefinite conservatorship as one 
step of a four-part rescue of the GSEs, which included the US Treasury’s establishment of a 
GSE mortgage-backed securities (MBS) purchase program (GSE MBS Program). This case 
examines the GSE MBS Program, pursuant to which Treasury purchased $225 billion in GSE 
MBS in the open market, and finds it difficult to quantify the program’s exact impact given 
the simultaneous implementation of other measures for the GSEs as well as the Federal 
Reserve’s later adoption of its own MBS purchase program. 
 
1 This case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in 
detail the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs: 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A:  The Conservatorships” by Daniel 
Thompson and Rosalind Z. Wiggins. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by 
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008” by Daniel Thompson. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson and Adam Kulam. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, 
Benjamin Henken, Adam Kuman, Daniel Thompson, and Andrew Metrick. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Michael Zanger-Tishler - Research Assistant, YPFS, Yale School of Management. 
3 Rosalind Z. Wiggins - Director, the Global Financial Crisis Project, and Senior Editor, YPFS, Yale School of 
Management. 
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At a Glance  
During the summer of 2008, the US housing 
and mortgage markets experienced severe 
distress because of the subprime mortgage 
crisis. The Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), publicly traded government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), by the end of 
2007 guaranteed or owned approximately 
50% of outstanding US mortgages. The 
firms, which had increased their exposure 
to subprime and Alt-A mortgages, funding 
their growth by dramatically increasing 
their leverage, began posting increasing 
losses. The Federal Reserve agreed to 
provide liquidity to the companies—if 
needed—in an attempt to reassure their 
investors and counterparties. However, problems persisted.   
As a result, on September 6, 2008, with both firms barely solvent, Treasury placed both 
GSEs into conservatorship pursuant to a four-part rescue plan that included Treasury’s 
creation of a facility to purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the GSEs (the 
GSE MBS Program). The amount and timing of the purchases were open-ended and at the 
discretion of Treasury Secretary. The program was implemented quickly using third-party 
financial agents.  Purchases of GSE MBS in the open market began in September 2008 and 
continued through December 31, 2009, when Treasury’s authority to purchase these 
securities ended. In total, Treasury purchased $105.9 billion of Freddie Mac MBS and 
$114.8 of Fannie Mae MBS, for a total of $220.8 billion (face value), investing $225 billion. 
On March 21, 2011, Treasury announced that it would sell off its remaining GSE MBS 
Program portfolio (face value of $142 billion) at a rate of no more than $10 billion per 
month, to avoid disrupting the markets. Sales were concluded in March 2012 and Treasury 
reported that it had received total revenue of $250 billion for a profit to taxpayers of $25 
billion. 
Summary Evaluation 
It is difficult to isolate the effect of Treasury’s GSE MBS Program. It was one component of 
the government’s four-part GSE rescue plan, and shortly after Treasury began its rescue 
operations, the Federal Reserve also began purchasing GSE MBS in volumes that dwarfed 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To support the distressed housing finance 
market by purchasing GSE MBS on the open market. 
Announcement Date September 6, 2008 
Operational Date End of September 2008 
Expiration Date (New 
Purchases)  




March 11, 2011 
Final MBS Sale Date  March 19, 2012 
Legal Authority HERA §1117 
Peak Utilization $225 billion   
Sponsor US Treasury 




US Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program 
368
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins
 
 
Treasury’s program (ultimately buying $1.2 trillion). There is some evidence that the GSE 
MBS Program may have been too small to have any impact. The mortgage market did begin 
to recover in late 2008. However, authorities disagree whether and how much of this shift 
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Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program:  United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
$14,628.02 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100.00 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year 
senior debt)  






Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9789.07 in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
66.92% in 2009 
Size of banking system assets as a 
percentage of financial system 
assets  
29.0% in 2007 
30.5% in 2008 
30.25% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
44.27% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
19% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2008 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2009 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. 
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In 2007 and 2008, the United States (US) mortgage market experienced severe distress as 
the exuberant housing market began to slow (FCIC 2011b, 309). In particular, rates of 
default on subprime and Alt-A (collectively, nonprime) mortgages increased dramatically 
and housing prices fell (FCIC 2011b, 309). Mortgage lending and private mortgage 
securitization contracted severely, which in turn fueled additional defaults and 
devaluations of mortgage-related assets held by a wide range of domestic and foreign 
banks and financial institutions (FCIC 2011b, 309–312).  
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are publicly traded government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) authorized by congressional charter to support the residential mortgage 
market by creating a secondary market and advancing affordable housing policy (FCIC 
2011a, 38–39). At the end of 2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collectively held or 
guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgage debt, approximately half of all outstanding mortgages 
in the US (FCIC 2011b, 309). Because private securitization of mortgages had contracted, it 
was critical for the GSEs to continue to support the market during this period, which they 
did even though the new mortgages that the firms guaranteed and bought included higher 
percentages of nonprime mortgages (FCIC 2011b, 309–312).  
As defaults on the mortgages that the GSEs had guaranteed increased, so too did their 
liabilities (FCIC 2011b, 314).5 The firms’ investment portfolios also suffered because of 
devaluations and in June 2008, the GSEs posted a combined $14.2 billion in losses for the 
first half of 2008 highlighting the severity of the situation (Frame et al. 2015, 10). 
Additionally, during the years leading up to mid- 2008, the firms had increased their 
leverage and reliance on short-term financing while their capital remained at less than 2%, 
as was permitted by law (FCIC 2011b, 309). Investors pulled back from funding the firms 
as they struggled (FCIC 2011b, 313–316).  
Treasury and the Federal Reserve moved quickly to make additional liquidity available to 
the firms (FCIC 2011b, 316–318). However, such measures were not enough, and it soon 
became clear to policymakers and market participants that the GSEs would not be able to 
weather the correction on their own (FCIC 2011b, 317–321). Regulators believed it was 
almost certain that if the GSEs failed, the US housing market would fail with them (FCIC 
2011b, 314). Therefore, on September 6, 2008, the firms’ new regulator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),6 placed them under conservatorship as one component of 
 
5 Most of the cumulative losses (73%) experienced by the firms during 2008 occurred in the single-family 
mortgages that they guaranteed, including Alt-A mortgages (FCIC 2011c, 123). 
6 The FHFA was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA 2008). For more 
information on HERA, see Thompson 2021. 
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a four-part rescue plan (US Treasury 2008a).7 The next day Treasury Department 
announced three additional components of the rescue plan: (1) to enter into senior 
preferred stock purchase agreements with both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; (2) to 
establish a credit facility; and (3) to establish an MBS purchasing facility to purchase MBS 
issued by the GSEs (US Treasury 2008a).  
Program Description 
The GSE MBS Program was established pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 (HERA 2008),8 which had been adopted in July 2008 at the urging of Secretary 
Paulson and others as the housing crisis, and its effects on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
worsened (HERA; FCIC 2011b, 309). The program was intended to “support the availability 
of mortgage financing for millions of Americans” and “promote the stability of the mortgage 
market” (US Treasury 2008a; US Treasury 2008b). The dilemma facing the government in 
September 2008 was that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were key to the recovery of the 
mortgage market, which was reeling from the housing crisis, particularly since private 
securitization had contracted severely (FCIC 2011b, 311–312). Yet, the more mortgages the 
GSEs purchased and guaranteed, the more risk the weakened firms absorbed against a 
capital base that was by all accounts insufficient (FCIC 2011b, 315–318). This was 
especially true since a greater proportion of new mortgages were nonprime, Alt-A, and 
subprime mortgages, which were at the greatest risk of default (FCIC 2011b, 311–312). 
And stabilizing the GSEs might not be enough to prevent the collapse of the housing market 
if they could not continue to purchase and guarantee loans at least at traditional rates (FCIC 
2011b, 309–310). As a result, the government established the GSE MBS Program to 
purchase new GSE MBS directly in the open market to support the secondary market for 
housing finance (US Treasury 2008a). 
When announced, the size and timing of the GSE MBS Program were not stated definitively 
but were characterized as being at the discretion of Treasury Secretary, and purchases 
were limited to MBS issued by the two GSEs only (US Treasury 2008a). The scale of the 
program was to be based on developments in the capital markets and housing markets (US 
Treasury 2008b). No dollar limits were stated, so in theory the upper limit was subject to 
the statutory debt limit (which the passage of HERA increased by $800 billion to 
accommodate the possible rescue of the firms) (FCIC 2011b, 316–317). 
 
7 Conservatorship is closer to a bankruptcy reorganization procedure than an orderly liquidation process. 
The conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was permitted by the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act (HERA), which was enacted on July 30, 2008. A resolution process was needed because the GSEs were 
exempt from the Bankruptcy Code (Frame et al. 2015, 18–21). HERA also gave Treasury the ability to make 
unlimited debt and equity investments in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
increased the federal debt ceiling by $800 billion, to $1.6 trillion, to provide funds for such endeavors, if 
needed (FCIC 2011b, 316–317).   
8 Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, approved July 30, 2008. HERA authorized the Secretary of Treasury to 
support Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks by purchasing obligations and other 
securities from these GSEs (HERA 2008). It also created a new regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
FHFA (HERA 2008). 
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Utilization of Financial Agents 
Trading in GSE MBS is a sophisticated business requiring specialized knowledge and 
resources (US Treasury 2011b). It is a business that Treasury does not regularly engage in. 
Therefore, Treasury hired independent asset managers specializing in such trading as 
financial agents to administer the GSE MBS Program for it and manage the portfolio (US 
Treasury 2011b). Using financial agents enabled Treasury to quickly access the expertise 
needed to speedily implement the program and to maximize the taxpayers’ return on 
purchases  (US Treasury 2011b). 
The financial agents were selected by Treasury in a multi-step review process. In late 
August 2008, Treasury reviewed a list of the 20 largest fixed-income asset managers in the 
United States that had been provided by Morgan Stanley, which Treasury had hired to 
advise it in evaluating the GSEs and the housing finance market (OIG 2012, 3). Within a 
week, Treasury had narrowed this list to 10 firms with expertise in MBS (OIG 2012, 3–4). 
The 10 firms signed non-disclosure agreements, and Treasury requested detailed 
proposals from all 10 (OIG 2012, 4). Seven companies provided proposals; Treasury held 
interviews with five of them and selected two (OIG 2012, 4). Agreements, including a fee 
structure lower than any that the seven firms had proposed, were offered by Treasury and 
accepted by the two firms that were appointed: State Street Global Advisors (State Street) 
and the New York branch of Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) (OIG 2012, 4). 
State Street and Barclays each signed a Financial Agency Agreement (FAA) that outlined 
the responsibilities of the parties and certain other operating requirements such as 
confidentiality (OIG 2012, 4–5).9 Treasury chose two agents because it believed that it was 
important that no single market participant was fully aware of Treasury’s market 
involvement, and that Treasury could acquire more market information through multiple 
agents (OIG 2012, 4). 
While an audit report from Treasury’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found the selection 
process Treasury followed to be reasonable, especially considering the exigent 
circumstances at the time, it nonetheless criticized the department for not having a policy 
for selection of financial agents and for not maintaining a record to support its evaluation 
and selection (OIG 2012, 1–3). It recommended that such a policy be adopted and that in 
the future, some form of written notes of the process be maintained to be consistent with 
government rules (OIG 2012, 1–3).10  
State Street and Barclays were both active while Treasury was purchasing MBS under the 
program. After Treasury’s purchasing power expired on December 31, 2009, Treasury 
terminated its FAA contract with Barclays and transferred the remaining portfolio to State 
 
9 State Street signed on September 15, 2008, and Barclays signed on September 18, 2008, the same day that 
JPMorgan Chase signed an FAA limited to custodial and accounting services (OIG 2012, 4). 
10 Treasury agreed with the OIG’s recommendations and concurred that it had consciously failed to comply 
with documentation standards because of the exigent circumstances, staffing limitations, and the need for 
confidentiality (OIG 2012, 18–19). 
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Street because Treasury decided that it needed only one agent to manage the portfolio (OIG 
2012, 5).  
Treasury also hired JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (JPMChase) to serve as custodian for the 
portfolio through a non-competitive process because of its prior custodian experience and 
familiarity with Treasury operations (OIG 2012, 4–5).   
Guidelines and Instructions 
Both financial agents were subject to guidelines developed by Treasury, which relied on the 
financial agents to assist Treasury in accomplishing its own objectives: to promote market 
stability, ensure mortgage availability, and protect the taxpayer, including managing risk 
and avoiding losses (OIG 2012, 10; US Treasury 2011b, 5). Specific guidelines addressed 
strategic parameters for Treasury trading, safeguarding confidential information, and 
ongoing monitoring by Treasury to ensure that programmatic goals were achieved (OIG 
2013, 3). Treasury had discretion to hold the purchased MBS to maturity, or based on 
market conditions, to sell parts of it or otherwise adjust the portfolio to better achieve 
Treasury’s objectives (US Treasury 2008b). The latter was accomplished by Treasury 
through ongoing communication with agents’ senior management, daily monitoring of 
trades, and site visits to the agents’ trading floors (OIG 2013, 3).11  
Treasury terminated its FAA with Barclays in December 2009 at the expiration of its 
authority to purchase agency MBS (OIG 2013, 5). At that time, the remainder of the GSE 
MBS portfolio held by Barclays was transferred to State Street, which managed the 
combined portfolio for Treasury until it was sold (OIG 2013, 5).  
Outcomes 
Noting that the market for GSE MBSs had significantly improved, Treasury announced on 
March 21, 2011 that it would begin to sell off its remaining MBS portfolio, which then had a 
face value of $142 billion, and wind down the GSE MBS Program (US Treasury 2011a). 
Treasury intended to sell the portfolio at a rate of no more than $10 billion (face value) per 
month in an effort to prevent market disruption (US Treasury 2011a). The sales were 
managed by State Street with the assistance of Smith Graham Investment Advisors, which 
Treasury hired as a contractor (OIG 2013, 5, 13). 
Sales of Treasury’s GSE MBS portfolio were concluded on March 19, 2012, and the 
department reported that it had received total revenues of $250 billion for a profit to 
taxpayers of $25 billion (US Treasury 2012). 
 
11 A second Treasury audit report describes in detail Treasury’s monitoring of the agents and found that 
Treasury administered the program consistent with its authority under HERA (OIG 2013, 2). However, the 
report criticized the department on two points. First, the department failed to document its monitoring 
actions, and secondly, it failed to properly assess the strict need for both a physical and ethical wall to 
preserve confidentiality (OIG 2013, 2–3, 5). Treasury accepted both recommendations and both should be 
considered in undertaking any future similar program (OIG 2013, 4). 
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Figure 1: Treasury Purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBS (in billions of USD) 
 
Notes: Figures are in billions of dollars. Treasury’s GSE MBS purchase program was set to 
expire on December 31, 2009 (HERA 2008). Columns may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: FHFA 2014. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The GSE MBS Program was authorized under HERA. 
The GSE MBS Program was authorized under HERA, which was adopted in July 2008 
(HERA 2008). Treasury officials recognized the systemic importance of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, which, as of the end of 2007, financed or guaranteed 50% of outstanding 
residential mortgages; officials further anticipated that the firms might not be able to 
survive the housing correction on their own (FCIC 2010, 17). By the end of 2007, the 
entities were purchasing 75% of new mortgages, two times the level of a year earlier, a 
strong indication of how the private securitization market had dried up (FCIC 2011b, 312). 
HERA provided several broad authorities to the Treasury Secretary, the newly created 
FHFA, and Federal Reserve, which led to creation of a four-part rescue plan in September 
2008, and included the GSE MBS Program (US Treasury 2008a). The Secretary’s use of the 
granted authority was conditioned on a finding that an emergency existed, in other words, 
that such actions were necessary to: 
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• “provide stability to the financial markets; 
• “prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and 
• “protect the taxpayer” (HERA 2008, Sec. 1117[a]).  
Treasury’s September 7, 2008, press release affirmed these objectives as support for the 
rescue plan (US Treasury 2008a).  
The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac differed from that of other large companies that 
came under severe financial duress during the fall of 2008 (FCIC 2011b, 319–321). The 
government was proactive in evaluating the decline of the companies, sought expanded 
remedial authority, and proactively crafted a solution before the companies faced 
imminent failure (FCIC 2011b, 319–321). This is most likely due to their status as GSEs, the 
recognized fact that the companies’ concentration in the housing finance market was 
systemic, and that there existed an implied governmental guarantee that was known to 
have been relied upon by investors (US Treasury 2008a).  
2. The GSE MBS Program was one component of a four-part rescue plan designed to 
save the two GSEs from insolvency and to prevent the parallel collapse of the 
housing market. 
The GSE MBS Program was announced in conjunction with the conservatorship of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and was part of the four-part rescue plan designed to prevent the 
GSEs’ collective insolvency and the concomitant collapse of the housing market (US 
Treasury 2008a). The primary goal of Treasury’s GSE MBS Program was to maintain the 
secondary housing finance market, which in conjunction with the other emergency actions 
was meant to achieve the overall objectives of the rescue plan. (US Treasury 2008a).  
By the fall of 2007, private MBS securitization had been severely constricted as investors 
shied away from real estate assets (FCIC 2011b, 311–312). Large lenders began holding 
loans that they had previously securitized (FCIC 2011b, 309). Some smaller lenders that 
could not sell their loans failed, and others told the GSEs that they too would fail if the GSEs 
did not continue to purchase their loans (FCIC 2011b, 310). In August 2007 the GSEs asked 
their regulators to expand their ability to purchase more loans, a request that was 
originally denied, but was later granted in mid-September, as the mortgage market became 
even more constricted (FCIC 2011b, 309–312). By the fourth quarter of 2007, the GSEs 
were purchasing 75% of new mortgages, twice the 2006 rate (FCIC 2011b, 312).  
The companies’ weakened states would not allow them to continue purchasing mortgages 
at historic rates12 (US Treasury 2008a). Yet, without a viable secondary market, the 
 
12 It is worth noting that the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the GSEs’ regulator 
prior to FHFA, made several deregulatory efforts to shore up confidence for the GSEs by reducing their 
regulatory burdens during the worst of the market downturn. In mid-September 2007, OFHEO increased the 
firms’ allowable investment portfolios by about $7 billion address the contraction in the mortgage market—
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mortgage market would have continued to contract, disabling not only housing but 
potentially the wider economy as well (US Treasury 2008a). By purchasing MBS issued by 
the firms, Treasury attempted to maintain the secondary market for mortgages, in effect 
stepping in to perform a role that the GSEs could no longer play for themselves and 
providing confidence to investors (US Treasury 2008a). However, it was critical that the 
GSE MBS Program be part of a comprehensive plan (US Treasury 2008a). Stabilizing the 
GSEs might not have been enough to prevent the collapse of the housing market if they 
could not continue to purchase and guarantee loans at least at traditional rates (FCIC 
2011b, 309–310). Moreover, if Treasury merely backstopped the secondary market 
without the other elements (capital and liquidity), the firms still might have collapsed and 
sent shockwaves throughout the market and the economy (US Treasury 2008a). 
3. The GSE MBS Program was limited to purchasing GSE MBS in the open market. 
Pursuant to the enactment of HERA, the Treasury Secretary was authorized to purchase 
any obligation or other security issued by the GSEs on such terms and conditions as he 
determined (HERA 2008). However, the GSE MBS Program, as established, was limited to 
purchasing only MBS issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (HERA; US Treasury 2008a). 
Treasury purchased $220.8 billion (face value) in GSE MBS pursuant to the program: 
$114.8 billion of Fannie Mae MBS, and $105.9 billion of Freddie Mac MBS, which was 
consistent with the stated aim of the rescue plan (FHFA 2014; US Treasury 2008b). The 
department purchased the GSE MBS in the open market rather than from the enterprises 
directly (OIG 2013, 13).  
This had several benefits. First, it helped to maintain the flow of funding to mortgage 
originators and thus the availability of new mortgage financing, as the GSEs continued 
buying mortgages to bundle into its MBS, a critical need since private securitization had 
drastically contracted. (US Treasury 2008a). This, in turn, was intended to have a positive 
effect on mortgage affordability (US Treasury 2008a). Last, by purchasing in the open 
market rather than from the GSEs directly, the program supported the weakened market 
for new GSE MBS by stimulating the private market rather than by merely replacing it. 
Investors would be more likely to purchase new GSE MBS given the possibility that they 
could also sell the securities if need be. 
4. Treasury could purchase an unspecified amount of securities under the GSE MBS 
Program. 
HERA granted Treasury temporary, but unlimited, authority to invest in the GSEs and their 
securities and obligations, terms that Secretary Paulson had pushed for (HERA; FCIC 
 
even though OFHEO officials recognized that the firms were in a weakened state at the time (FCIC 2011b, 
311–312). OFHEO also loosened the GSEs’ capital requirements from 30% to 20% in March 2008, with the 
aim of helping the GSEs raise new capital from private investors (FCIC 2011b, 313–315). Though Fannie Mae 
kept up its end of the bargain and was permitted to lower its capital requirements by an additional 5%; 
Freddie Mac failed to raise new capital, and market confidence for both enterprises continued to plummet 
through June 2008 (FCIC 2011b, 315). 
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2011b, 316-317). HERA also granted discretion to the Treasury Secretary to determine 
when to exercise such purchasing authority and the scale of such exercise (US Treasury 
2008b). 
Pursuant to this authority, the GSE MBS Program was announced without any authorized 
amount or limit (other than limits related to Treasury debt limit) (US Treasury 2008a; FCIC 
2011b, 317). This open-ended announcement was done primarily to signal to the markets 
and investors (1) Treasury’s willingness to purchase as much MBS as necessary, and (2) 
that the size of the problem was not known (Paulson 2010, Ch. 7). It also signaled that the 
Treasury Secretary and department would be closely monitoring developments in the 
capital and housing markets and stood ready and able to act accordingly (US Treasury 
2008a). 
Treasury began to make purchases of GSE MBS in September 2008 from the open market 
and continued to make purchases each month thereafter (FHFA 2014). Monthly amounts 
purchased from the GSEs varied widely from $0.9 billion to a high of $18.1 billion and 
amounts purchased from each GSE fluctuated (FHFA 2014). Purchases were conducted by 
the financial agents at the direction of Treasury, which continuously monitored the agents’ 
activities (OIG 2013, 4–6, 13). Ultimately, Treasury purchased a total of $225 billion of 
agency MBS prior to the expiration of its purchasing authority in December 2009 (OIG 
2013, 13). 
5. Treasury designated independent asset managers as financial agents, whose role 
was to purchase GSE MBS on behalf of Treasury and to manage the resulting 
portfolio. 
Trading in MBS is a complex and sophisticated skill that requires specialized knowledge, 
technology, and other resources (US Treasury 2011b). Treasury did not engage in such 
trading on an ongoing basis (US Treasury 2011b). Moreover, it would have demanded 
considerable resources for Treasury to hire appropriate staff into the Department at a time 
when they were already strained and would have diverted existing staff from other critical 
matters they were dealing with during the crisis (US Treasury 2011b; OIG 2013, 6). Such a 
project would also have taken time, potentially delaying the implementation of the 
program.  
Instead, Treasury chose independent financial advisers with expertise in trading GSE MBS 
to administer the GSE MBS Program and used a multi-tiered selection process to find the 
advisers that would best assist with the program’s objectives (US Treasury 2008b; OIG 
2012, 3–7). Treasury ultimately selected two advisers, State Street and Barclays, to build 
competition into the process, and so that no single agent would know Treasury’s entire 
trading strategy (OIG 2012, 4–5). Utilizing independent advisers enabled the department to 
tap the best experts in the area and to quickly operationalize the GSE MBS program (OIG 
2012, 3–7). Financial advisers also promoted efficiency and the minimizing of operational 
and financial risks (OIG 2012, 5–6).   
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Treasury began evaluating potential advisers in late August, announced the rescue plan on 
September 7, signed FAA agreements on September 15, and made its first purchases on 
September 23, 2008 (US Treasury 2008a; OIG 2012, 16–17).  Treasury staff monitored the 
agents’ activities and trades and instructed them on the purchases (OIG 2013, 4–6). 
According to OIG, Treasury failed to adequately document its agency-selection process 
before the program began as well as the oversight processes after the program was up and 
running (OIG 2012, 3–7; OIG 2013, 4–6). In response, Treasury reported that it had 
intentionally deployed personnel to other critical crisis management efforts, rather than 
expend the resources to document the financial agent selection and oversight processes. 
They argued that the completion of normal administrative processes could have been 
counterproductive to Treasury’s overall crisis response (OIG 2012, 2–7; OIG 2013, 4–6). 
6. Although it was authorized to hold the MBS portfolio to maturity, Treasury opted 
to unwind its positions as market conditions improved. 
Under HERA and the GSE MBS Program, it was within Treasury’s discretion to decide how 
long to hold the MBS that it purchased, including retaining the securities until their 
maturity (US Treasury 2008b). In March 2011, when Treasury announced that it would 
begin the sale and wind-down of its portfolio of MBS, it also stated that the market for the 
securities had greatly improved (US Treasury 2011a). Sales were to be conducted at a 
“gradual and orderly pace to maximize the recovery of taxpayer dollars and help protect 
the process of repair of the housing finance market” (US Treasury 2011a). Sales could occur 
daily but would not be conducted at pre-scheduled times or in pre-announced sizes of 
individual trades (US Treasury 2011b, 3). Sales would be in amounts up to $10 billion per 
month, subject to adjustment per market conditions (US Treasury 2011b, 3).  
State Street managed MBS sales with the assistance of Smith Graham Investment Advisors, 
which Treasury hired as a contractor (OIG 2013, 13; US Treasury 2011b, 6). At the 
announced rate, Treasury expected to have disposed of the portfolio within a year and to 
return a profit to the taxpayers after fully winding down the portfolio (US Treasury 2011a; 
US Treasury 2011b, 1). 
Treasury concluded its sales of MBS on March 19, 2012 (US Treasury 2012). In total, sale of 
Treasury’s GSE MBS portfolio, originally acquired at a cost of $225 billion, generated 
revenue of $250 billion, returning to taxpayers a profit of $25 billion from sales, principal, 
and interest (US Treasury 2012). 
7. Treasury implemented the GSE MBS Program with deliberate transparency. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were systemically important to the residential finance market 
and their shares, debt, and MBS were widely held by many investors including financial 
institutions, pension funds, state and local governments and foreign central banks (US 
Treasury 2008a). Any failure or deterioration of the companies could have significant and 
far-reaching consequences (US Treasury 2008a). Moreover, given the expected size of the 
GSE MBS program, and the subsequent sales of purchased MBS securities, there would 
naturally be concern about the impact of such large trades (US Treasury 2011a). 
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Additionally, because of the implied government guarantee, any deterioration of the firms 
could reverberate negatively and affect the investors’ attitudes towards the US 
government’s debt (Paulson 2010, Ch. 1).  
Mindful of these concerns, Treasury undertook to maintain transparency with respect to 
the GSE MBS Program and communicated frequently regarding its rationale and actions. 
The press releases and other public communications relating to the program shared the 
following characteristics:  
• placed the GSE MBS Program within the context of the broader rescue plan for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,  
• discussed the program’s implications for the housing finance market, and  
• conveyed a message that Treasury was constantly monitoring the markets and 
could and would adjust its activities as market conditions warranted.  
Press releases, and the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)13 that accompanied them, 
provided additional program details and anticipated concerns (US Treasury 2008a; US 
Treasury 2008b; US Treasury 2011a; US Treasury 2011b). Data regarding the amount of 
GSE MBS purchases, and then sales (broken down by coupon and agency), were included in 
the Final Monthly Treasury Statement of Receipts and Outlays of the United States 
Government posted on the department’s website monthly where they were publicly 
available (FHFA 2014). 
III. Evaluation 
For several reasons, it is difficult to isolate the effect of Treasury’s GSE MBS Program. First, 
it was one component of the government’s four-part GSE rescue plan. Second, shortly after 
it began operations, the Federal Reserve14 began purchasing GSE MBS in volumes that 
dwarfed Treasury’s program.  
Treasury purchased $3.4 billion, $15.9 billion, and $28.4 billion of GSE MBS in September, 
October, and November 2008, respectively, but there is some evidence that the impacts 
were lackluster (FHFA 2014). An article in National Mortgage News on October 27, 2008, 
 
13 For example, the FAQs accompanying the announcement of the sale of the portfolio discuss what 
information would be made available and when and explain the department’s rationale (US Treasury 2011b). 
Treasury also published a monthly report of broker-dealer market shares for MBS sales, which was intended 
to “both maximize taxpayer returns and provide additional transparency” (US Treasury 2011b). 
14 Treasury’s GSE MBS program was separate from, but related to, the Federal Reserve Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAP) Program (also known as Quantitative Easing). The Federal LSAP program was announced on 
November 25, 2008; purchases began on January 5, 2009 and continued through March 31, 2010. Overall, the 
Federal Reserve GSE MBS Purchase Program bought $1.25 trillion of GSE MBS. For more information on the 
LSAP Program, see Thompson and Kulam 2021. 
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quoted one analyst who claimed that the effect of the program had been minimal and that 
government efforts needed “to be aggressive and more public to impact pricing in this part 
of the MBS market" (Collins 2008). 
About two months after Treasury began its MBS purchases, in an effort to impact mortgage 
rates, which remained high, the Federal Reserve announced that it would purchase up to 
$500 billion in GSE MBS—later expanded to $1.25 trillion—as part of its Large-Scale Asset 
Purchasing Program (LSAP) (Federal Reserve 2008; Stroebel and Taylor 2012, 1–3). The 
reasons given for the Federal Reserve’s program also implied that Treasury’s GSE MBS 
Program had not yet achieved intended effects on the housing finance markets: 
Spreads of rates on GSE debt and on GSE-guaranteed mortgages have 
widened appreciably of late. This action is being taken to reduce the cost and 
increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn 
should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial 
markets more generally (Federal Reserve 2008).  
Secondary mortgage market spreads did begin to fall in late 2008 (Stroebel and Taylor 
2012, 3). However, authorities disagree whether this shift was due to the government’s 
programs. Stroebel and Taylor (2012) considered the two MBS Purchase Programs 
together, and, after controlling for default risk and prepayment risk, the authors concluded 
that only a small amount of the narrowing of mortgage spreads was attributable to the 
programs (Stroebel and Taylor 2012, 38-40). However, it is important to note that the 
Federal Reserve first LSAP was nearly eight times larger than the Treasury’s MBS Purchase 
Program, and involved multiple asset classes (Stroebel and Taylor 2012, 1-3). 
Hancock and Passmore (2011) also considered the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchase 
program and concluded that its announcement “substantially improved market functioning 
and provided a strong statement of government support for US mortgage markets” 
(Hancock and Passmore 2011, 513). Specifically, the authors found that the announcement 
period of the Federal Reserve’s program coincided with an 82-basis-point drop in 
mortgage rates (Hancock and Passmore 2011, 513).  
Overall, the authors concluded that the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchase program had a 
positive effect, reestablished normal market pricing in the MBS market, and resulted in 
mortgage rates of roughly 100 basis points lower (Hancock and Passmore 2011, 499). 
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